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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) observed,
“[C]hoosing the means or policy instruments to meet environment
goals . . . can be a surprisingly complex task for decision-makers . . . .”1
Kenneth Richards’ article, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument
Choice,2 offers a powerful way to address this complexity.  His multi-
factored analytical framework for deciding which instrument has the
best chance of minimizing PC + IC + TX (the “constrained optimiza-
tion formula”)3 is new to the literature.  Moreover, his situation-
specific analysis provides useful new insights, including:
• the greater attractiveness of incentive-based instruments where
the range of technology options is greatest or applications are
varied;4
• the tendency of measurement costs (a subset of implementa-
tion costs) to rise as the realm of private party discretion in in-
strument choice increases;5
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1. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, REP. NO. OTA-ENV-634,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS—A USER’S GUIDE 1 (1995) <http:www.wws.princeton.edu/~
ota/> [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
2. Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221 (2000).
3. Richards defines PC as “production costs” (which include capital, training, operation,
maintenance, and management costs of producing emissions abatement), IC as “implementation
costs” (which include measurement and “governance” costs), and TX as “public finance im-
pacts.”  See Richards, supra note 2, at 228-29.
4. See id. at 256, 265.
5. See id. at 258.
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• the desirability of paying interest on saved allowances;6 and
• the characterization of “voluntary” regulation as an example of
the “Calabresian role” for government (i.e., assignment of
property rights and liability rules),7 which reveals that this in-
strument is subject to the same pitfalls as relying on the mar-
ket, private bargaining, or private litigation to reduce pollu-
tion.
Although we find much to like in Professor Richards’ taxonomy
and analysis, we also have some questions, hesitations, and disagree-
ments.  We would add, however, that the fact that the article stimu-
lated these responses indicates its value in focusing the debate over
policy instruments.  Our comments focus on four aspects of Professor
Richards’ framework.
First, the framework establishes a method of analyzing which
policy instrument might be the best (defined as lowest cost) option to
carry out a specific regulatory goal.  The choice of an environmental
goal is not the subject of the analysis.  The article, however, has a few
things to say about regulatory goals in establishing the basis for the
taxonomy to which we object.  More importantly, the analysis itself
hides a common confusion in the literature between regulatory goals
and policy instruments, which requires clarification.
Second, Professor Richards professes to be agnostic on the pref-
erability of various policy instruments, indicating that the lowest-cost
option may vest “production” decisions in the government rather
than in private parties.8  His commitment to carefully analyzing the
relative “costs” of instruments distinguishes him from many of his
fellow economists who are quick to assume that incentive-based in-
struments are preferable.  His analysis, however, is not always consis-
tent with this commitment, as we will indicate.
Third, the calculation of which instrument will create the lowest
costs is subject to pollution goals and existing legal and political con-
straints.  We believe that the legal constraints are less confining than
Richards appears to suggest, and that the political constraints are
more confining than he acknowledges.
Finally, the framework is based on institutional economics, which
focuses on the transaction costs arising out of, among other factors,
the bounded rationality of decision-makers.  While this analysis leads
6. See id. at 249.
7. See id. at 236, 251.
8. See id. at 225-26, 265.
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Professor Richards to important new insights, it also poses a challenge
for his cost-minimization framework that cannot be ignored.  Based
on realistic limitations on time, information, and understanding, it will
be difficult to make accurate comparisons among available policy in-
struments of the sum of (PC + IC + TX) for implementation pur-
poses.
II.  POLICY GOALS AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS
The formulation of environmental policy requires that policy-
makers address two “central questions: (1) what is the desired level of
environmental protection; and (2) what policy instruments should be
used to achieve this level of protection?”9  The goals established in re-
sponse to the first question are typically expressed in terms of either
numerical10 or narrative11 descriptions.  Those goals may be arrived at
through a variety of approaches.  Using what is often referred to as a
media quality-based approach,12 the policy-maker may set the goal by
determining how clean a particular environmental medium needs to
be to provide an acceptable level of protection to the relevant ex-
posed population or resource base.  Alternatively, the policy-maker
may establish the goal by determining what existing technology or an-
ticipated future technology is capable of achieving.  A third approach
is to set the goal based on a determination of the point at which the
cost of the next marginal level of pollution control is equal to the en-
vironmental benefit derived from achieving that incremental level of
control, on the theory that any additional control requirement would
cost more than it is worth.  The essential task of policy-makers ad-
dressing the second question involves, in Professor Richards’ termi-
9. Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 313  (1998).
10. The national ambient air quality standards established under the Clean Air Act
(CAA), for example, are expressed in terms of the maximum permissible concentrations of
pollutants in the ambient air.  See Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, 109(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q, 7409(b) (1994).
11. The Clean Water Act (CWA), for example, prohibits the discharge of oil into navigable
waters “in such quantities as may be harmful” to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment, as determined by the President or an agency to which he delegates his authority.  See
CWA §§ 101-607, 311(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, 1321(b)(3) (1994).  The U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) issued regulations defining as “harmful” any discharge that
causes a film or sheen upon the surface of the water.  See 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1997).  See also 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994) (enunciating the goal of achieving fishable/swimmable waters by July
1, 1983).
12. See e.g., JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION:  CASES –LEGISLATION –POLICIES 215 (2d ed. 1992).
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nology, “the selection of abatement practices.”13  At this step of the
process, environmental policy-makers have a broad range of instru-
ments from which to choose, as the summary of instrument categories
in Table A2 of Richards’ article vividly illustrates.14
The literature on environmental policy does not always carefully
distinguish between the issues raised by the question of how to set the
desired level of environmental protection and the question of how to
choose among the available instruments for achieving the goal that
has been established.  This blurring of the conceptually distinct ques-
tions of how to set the goal and how to achieve it has prompted criti-
cisms of existing environmental regulatory programs that may not be
justified.  It has made defensible choices of environmental policy-
makers appear to be irrational.  In particular, the blurring of the two
questions tends to mask the possibility that an environmental policy
goal might be set using criteria other than economic efficiency, but
that, once the goal has been established, regulators may select the
policy instrument likely to achieve that goal at the least cost.
Professor Richards’ article focuses on the second question—the
choice of policy “instruments that the government uses when it di-
rectly intervenes in environmental protection decisions”15—but it does
not entirely avoid contributing to the confusion that stems from the
failure to separate the two steps in the policy formulation process.
The article’s failure to delineate sharply between goals and instru-
ments has several potential consequences that the author does not in-
tend.  First, it may contribute to a mischaracterization of the rationale
for federal environmental regulation.  That mischaracterization, in
turn, may distort the rationale for combining a non-efficiency-based
environmental goal with an efficiency-based instrument for achieving
it.  Second, it may induce policy-makers to avoid one category of pol-
icy instruments—performance standards—that have the potential to
minimize the sum of production costs, implementation costs, and
public finance impacts.
Professor Richards describes a series of “dimensions” for differ-
entiating environmental policy instruments.16  The first dimension re-
lates to “the role of government in determining the degree of envi-
ronmental protection.”17  The government may simply define property
13. Richards, supra note 2, at 237.
14. See id. at 284.
15. Id. at 237.
16. Id. at 249, Table 1.
17. Id. at 235.
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rights and tort rules, and rely on “Coasean bargaining among indi-
viduals to determine the efficient level of environmental protection.”18
Alternatively, it may intervene when transaction costs, coordination
costs, and free-riding would prevent individuals from negotiating to
efficient outcomes despite the presence of well-defined property
rights.
The difficulty with Richards’ description of this choice as the
“first dimension” in selecting environmental policy instruments is that
the determination of the appropriate degree of environmental protec-
tion is a determination that relates to the establishment of a policy
goal rather than to the selection of a policy instrument to achieve it.
Further, the article’s description of when government intervention is
appropriate reflects the traditional economic justification for such in-
tervention.  It does not accurately reflect, however, the rationale ac-
tually advanced by environmental policy-makers, particularly in the
federal legislature, for foregoing exclusive reliance on common law
property and tort rules backed by private litigation to enforce them.
The economic justification for government regulation of activi-
ties with potential adverse effects on the environment is the need to
correct market failure.  Accordingly, the goal of regulation is to repli-
cate the result that private bargaining between the producers of envi-
ronmental externalities (“producers”) and those adversely affected by
them (“receptors”) would have produced in the free market in the ab-
sence of such failure.  That goal can be accomplished by adopting a
cost-benefit methodology for setting environmental quality goals,
such that the regulatory scheme requires a reduction in pollution up
to the point at which the marginal costs and benefits of the last unit of
pollution reduction are equivalent.  This result replicates the process
of private bargaining in a well-functioning market because, in the ab-
sence of regulation, the producer would be willing to reduce its pollu-
tion output only up to the point at which the cost of any further re-
duction would exceed the amount receptors are willing to pay to
avoid the adverse consequences of that output.  The receptors would
be willing to pay the producer only up to the point at which any
higher payment would exceed the value to them of being free of fur-
ther pollution.  Professor Richards also assumes a cost-benefit justifi-
cation in describing a grandfathered permit scheme as one in which
18. Id. at 236.
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“the government grants each firm allowances equal to that firm’s effi-
cient level of emissions.”19
Environmental regulation in this country, however, has rarely
been based exclusively, or even primarily, on this utilitarian justifica-
tion.  Statutes that employ a media quality-based approach start from
the premise that it is appropriate to adopt whatever pollution controls
are necessary to achieve a chosen level of environmental quality, re-
gardless of its cost.20  This approach may be based on the notion that
citizens have a right to a certain level of environmental quality.  Al-
ternatively, it might make sense on more pragmatic grounds in cir-
cumstances in which the policy-making entity has relatively good in-
formation about the relationship between various levels of exposure
and resulting harm to health or the environment (i.e., a well-defined
dose-response curve), but not much information about the costs of
employing alternative technological fixes.  While it may be appropri-
ate for policy-makers to consider cost in the selection of the appropri-
ate regulatory instrument, or even to allocate permissible emissions
based on a cost-benefit test, the goal itself is not based on a cost-
benefit test.  Even statutes requiring goals be set on the basis of tech-
nological feasibility do not reflect a cost-benefit justification.  Senator
Edmund Muskie, the principal sponsor of the CWA, justified the
statute’s regulatory approach as follows: “Can we afford clean water?
Can we afford rivers and lakes and streams and life itself?  Those
questions were never asked as we destroyed the waters of our Nation,
and they deserve no answers as we finally move to restore and renew
them.  These questions answer themselves.”21  Indeed, of the many
federal statutes adopted to protect the environment, only a few
19. Id. at 239.  The term “grandfathering” typically describes a situation in which a regula-
tory scheme exempts or provides preferential treatment for activities that predate the adoption
of the scheme.  In this context, a system of grandfathered marketable allowances presumably
refers to one in which allowable emissions are assigned based on preexisting levels of pollution
by regulated firms.  See, e.g., Keohane et al., supra note 9, at 316.  It is not clear whether Profes-
sor Richards is using the term “grandfathered” in this fashion.  The analysis of his framework
for the selection of environmental policy instruments would benefit from a more extensive de-
scription of what a system of grandfathered marketable allowances entails, and how it differs
from an auctioned marketable allowance system.
20. See Lead Indus. Ass’n. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that
Congress intended that “economic considerations play no part in the promulgation of” the na-
tional ambient air quality standards).  See also American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d
1027, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified on rehearing, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the
CAA precludes EPA from considering costs of implementation in setting the standards), cert.
granted sub nom., American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000).
21. 1 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, S. Rep.
No. 93-1, at 164 (1973).
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authorize implementing agencies to set goals by reference to a cost-
benefit rubric.22  Most of the federal environmental statutes are based
on alternative justifications, such as a commitment to do whatever is
necessary to provide adequate public health and environmental pro-
tection, provided it is not infeasible.23  Recent efforts to shift to an
economic justification by requiring that environmental regulation
satisfy a cost-benefit test have met with fierce opposition by public in-
terest groups.  Thus far, Congress, for the most part, has not aban-
doned its historical commitment to the use of alternative means of
setting regulatory goals.24
The fact that Congress has eschewed reliance on a cost-benefit
test for the establishment of environmental policy goals does not nec-
essarily mean that it has chosen to completely ignore costs, or even
the relationship between costs and benefits.  One of the disadvantages
of blurring the distinction between policy goals and instruments is
that it hides an important insight that flows from Professor Richards’
framework for selecting environmental policy instruments: it may
make sense to select cost-minimizing or cost-efficient instruments
even if the goals have been selected on the basis of some other yard-
stick.  There is no reason why, for example, a regulatory system where
a goal is set without reference to cost—such as a media quality-based
regulatory scheme—could not be coupled with incentive-based policy
instruments, such as marketable permits or pollution taxes, that are
traditionally favored by economists committed to the market replica-
tion theory of government intervention.
Indeed, such “non-traditional” policy instruments have become a
well-established part of the CAA’s national ambient air quality stan-
dards regulatory scheme, the archetypal environmental program
22. Those that do reflect a goal-setting process consistent with the traditional economic
rationale for government regulation include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) §§ 2-32, 2(bb), 3(c)(5)(C)-(D), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (1994); the
Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 60,102(b)(2)(C)-(E)
(Supp. III 1997); and perhaps the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) §§ 2-412, 6(a), (c)(1),
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692, 2605(a), (c)(1) (1994).
23. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory
State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1493-94 (1996) (“The purpose of pollution reduction standards is
to ensure that sources do the best they can to protect health and the environment, even if a de-
tailed cost-benefit analysis would suggest that less pollution reduction would be more effi-
cient.”).
24. But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6) (Supp. III 1997) (allowing EPA to establish maximum
contaminant levels for drinking water contaminants in public water systems at a level other than
the most feasible level if the benefits of a maximum contaminant level would not justify the
costs of achieving it).
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whose goals are set using a media quality-based approach.  EPA is-
sued an Emission Trading Policy Statement in 198625 to endorse vari-
ous forms of both intra-firm and inter-firm trading.26  Its 1994 Eco-
nomic Incentive Program27 was designed to encourage economically
efficient reduction of pollutants in areas of the country that have not
yet achieved the national standards by allowing sources that have
relatively high control costs to purchase allowances from sources with
lower control costs and that are therefore capable of “over-
controlling” to generate excess, saleable allowances.  The Program
even authorized trades between stationary and mobile sources.28
State environmental agencies have provided further opportunities for
the use of incentive-based instruments as a means of achieving the
levels of emissions reductions necessary to comply with the national
ambient air quality standards.29  Marketable permits and related in-
centive-based instruments also promise to play a larger role in the fu-
ture under the CWA, a statute that relies on a technology-based
scheme to set goals for categories of point sources.  EPA has consid-
ered authorizing trades between point and nonpoint sources as a
means of generating efficiencies in discharge reductions and reaching
sources that, to date, have not been regulated to any meaningful de-
gree.
One of the important contributions that Richards’ article makes
is the guidance it provides to environmental policy-makers for com-
paring a variety of available policy instruments and choosing the most
efficient among them.  This selection process may proceed regardless
of the nature of the mechanism chosen to set the policy goal.  Even
the opponents of cost-benefit justifications for environmental regula-
tion would find it hard to dispute the notion that it makes no sense to
ignore the most cost-effective means of achieving a media quality-
based or technology-based goal.
III.  DIFFERENTIATING COMMAND-AND-CONTROL INSTRUMENTS
Once the confusion over goals and instruments is clarified, Pro-
25. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986).
26. The “bubble concept” endorsed in the famous (or infamous) case of Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is an example of intra-firm
trading.
27. See Economic Incentive Program Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,690 (1994).
28. See id. at 16,696.
29. For further discussion of the use of incentive-based policy instruments under the CAA,
see FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 487-
96 (3d ed. 1999).
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fessor Richards’ article supports the important conclusion that policy-
makers can pair non-utilitarian environmental goals with regulatory
instruments that rely on economic incentives to reduce risks to hu-
mans and the environment.  This clarification is important because it
indicates that the interest of economists in replacing command-and-
control regulatory instruments with ones that rely on economic incen-
tives does not require Congress to change existing regulatory goals.
Richards discusses the choice between command-and-control
and market incentive instruments in his second dimension, which fo-
cuses on the “locus of discretion” for determining what abatement
tools will be used to meet environmental goals.30  Here Richards dis-
tinguishes between instances in which the government takes a hierar-
chical approach to decision-making by retaining control over instru-
ment selection and those in which regulated entities themselves
“identify the best way[ ] to meet pollution abatement requirements.”31
Richards includes “command-and-control” regulations under the ru-
bric of the hierarchical approach and incentive-based instruments as
examples of the private party control model.
The difficulty with the dichotomy drawn by Professor Richards is
that command-and-control regulation, as that term is typically em-
ployed, is not unidimensional.  It includes both design standards and
performance standards.  Both types of standards typically specify a
goal that the agency defines by ascertaining the level of pollution
abatement that  is technologically and economically possible for
regulated entities to achieve.  The difference is that under a design
standard the agency defines the method by which regulated entities
are required to achieve the goal—such as by installing and operating a
particular kind of pollution control technology or work practice—
whereas under a performance standard, regulated entities are free to
achieve the goal any way they want.  They can use the model technol-
ogy or work practice identified by the agency as the one that makes
compliance possible, or they can devise alternative means of meeting
the goal.  In theory at least, regulated entities subject to a perform-
ance standard have an incentive to develop such alternative means if
they provide a more efficient means of achieving the regulatory goal.32
30. Richards, supra note 2, at 237.
31. Id.
32. Some critics of command-and-control regulation, however, have asserted that controls
based on best available technology do not provide strong incentives to develop new, environ-
mentally superior technologies, and may even discourage their development.  See, e.g., Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334-
36 (1985).
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Thus, while design standards qualify as “hierarchical arrange-
ments,” in Professor Richards’ terminology, performance standards
are closer in this regard to the category of “private party control in-
struments” in which Richards places incentive-based environmental
policy instruments.  In describing Figure 3, in which he models vari-
ous combinations of dimensions two and three of his framework for
instrument selection, Richards notes that government production and
command-and-control regulation “in their purest form” maximize
government control over instrument selection.33  Perhaps he means by
that qualification to confine the entry for “command-and-control
regulation” in the figure to design standards.  Indeed, later in his de-
scription of dimension three, Richards describes performance stan-
dards as regulations that provide “more discretion to the polluting
firm regarding how to abate pollution.”34  Similarly, at the end of Part
IV.B.3, Richards concedes in his discussion of “intermediate instru-
ments” that “[i]n some applications, performance-based standards
provide private firms with more discretion (lower production costs)
than technology-based command-and-control standards.”35  The arti-
cle nevertheless presents the misleading impression that design stan-
dards are the norm in federal pollution control regulatory programs
and that performance standards represent the exception.  In fact, the
opposite is true.  The CWA, for example, requires that point sources
comply with a series of technology-based effluent limitations (nu-
merical goals),36 but allows those sources complete discretion to
choose the means of compliance.  The nationally uniform, technol-
ogy-based emission standards under the CAA by and large follow the
same pattern.37  On occasion, the statutes explicitly bar EPA from
33. See Richards, supra note 2, at 238.
34. Id. at 239.
35. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
36. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)-(2) (effluent limitations for existing point sources),
1316(a)(1), (e) (effluent limitations for new point sources), 1317(b)(1), (d) (1994) (pretreatment
standards for indirect point sources).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), (e) (national emission standards for new stationary
sources), 7412(d) (1994) (national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants).  Indeed, the
statute was amended in 1990 to eliminate provisions that effectively limited the discretion of
certain coal-burning sources to choose between scrubber installation and switching to fuels with
lower sulfur concentrations as means of compliance with the new source standards. Compare
the earlier 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1988) with the revised 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1994). The Act
authorizes EPA to promulgate design or work practice standards for new stationary sources, but
only if it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce a performance standard.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)
(1994).  This authority has rarely been invoked.
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specifying the means of compliance.38  Even where they do not do so,
however, it is clear that, as a general proposition, “the Administrator
is not to prescribe the technology which must be used, but is rather to
set discharge levels which can be met if indicated technology is used.
The choice of technology at each plant is left to the operator.”39
In short, Richards’ attempt to distinguish among environmental
policy instruments according to, among other things, the degree to
which they vest control over production decisions in the government
or in private parties is a useful device.  It should assist policy-makers
in the selection of those instruments that minimize the sum of produc-
tion costs, implementation costs, and public finance impacts, particu-
larly when coupled with insights such as the relatively greater attrac-
tiveness of incentive-based instruments in situations where the range
of technology options is greatest.40  Richards’ use of a government
versus private party control dichotomy should also help analysts to
identify those cases in which government regulators have not made an
optimal choice.  Both policy-makers and analysts could be led astray,
however, if they fail to recognize that a performance standard is
closer to the left side of Richards’ Figure 3 than it is to the right in
that it vests considerable, if not complete, discretion in the regulated
entity to select the means of regulatory compliance.  To that extent, it
should afford some of the same production-cost-minimization advan-
tages that other incentive-based standards do, if, as Richards posits,
non-hierarchical instruments “will virtually always lead to lower pro-
duction costs than the hierarchical instruments.”41  Thus, lumping de-
sign and performance standards together under the general rubric of
“command-and-control regulation” threatens to eliminate perform-
ance standards from consideration in circumstances in which they
might perform as well as “purer” incentive-based instruments in
terms of production cost-minimization, and better than those instru-
ments from the vantage point of either implementation costs or public
38. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7423(c) (1994) (“In no event may [EPA] prohibit any increase in
any stack height or restrict in any manner the stack height of any source”).
39. CPC Int’l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1045 n.25 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing S. Rep. No. 92-
414, at 1477 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 311, in A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972)).  This is such a fundamental point that one would expect it
to be highlighted in academic and judicial treatments of the federal pollution control laws.  In
fact, it sometimes escapes recognition altogether. But cf. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 155 (2d ed. 1996) (performance
standards “routinely devolve into de facto design standards”).
40. See Richards, supra note 2, at 256.
41. Id.
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finance impacts.  Performance standards rely on particular technolo-
gies to formulate pollution reduction goals, but do not dictate that
those same technologies be used as policy instruments to achieve
those goals.
By way of digression, we would offer one final suggestion in rela-
tion to Figure 3.  The lower, right-hand corner of the figure is meant
to represent situations in which the government controls the selection
of abatement practices but imposes both abatement and residual
pollution costs on private parties.  Professor Richards suggests that,
although this combination of his second and third dimensions must
exist “in theory,”42 there is currently no term for such an instrument.
Accordingly, Richards leaves a question mark in that corner of the
figure “for now.”43  In fact, although it may not have the benefit of an
impressive moniker, a product or chemical ban fits the description, if
only because a prohibition results in the elimination of residual pollu-
tion costs.  Although such bans are rare under the federal environ-
mental laws, they do surface on occasion.44  Nevertheless, we agree
with Professor Richards’ implicit conclusion that this “arrangement”
deserves relatively less emphasis than those represented in the other
five entries in Figure 3.45
IV. THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF INCENTIVE-BASED
INSTRUMENTS
A strength of Professor Richards’ analysis, as we noted in the in-
troduction, is that it purports to be, and for the most part is, agnostic
on the preferability of various policy instruments.  He prefers the
policy instrument that will in a given case minimize the sum of (PC +
IC + TX).  Further, he notes that “[i]n some settings, instruments such
42. See id. at 243.  One is reminded of the genesis of the famous “rule four” for resolving
private nuisance disputes generated more or less contemporaneously in Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1116 (1972), and in Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108
Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).  See also ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 29, at 1135-36; JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 774-75 (4th ed. 1998).
43. See Richards, supra note 2, at 243.
44. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671c(a)-(b), 7671d(a)-(b) (1994) (phasing out the production and
consumption of chemicals with the potential to harm the stratospheric ozone layer); 15 U.S.C. §
2605(e) (1994) (phasing out the manufacture, processing, and use of polychlorinated biphenyls).
Both sets of prohibitions, of course, are subject to the usual panoply of exemptions and excep-
tions.  To the extent these exceptions and exemptions exist, they may well generate residual
pollution costs that will not be borne by the private parties.  To the extent this is so, the regula-
tory provision will move up along the vertical axis (Distribution of Costs) of Richards’ Figure 3.
45. See Richards, supra note 2, at 243.
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as command-and-control regulation and government production may
provide greater overall economic efficiency than their incentive-based
counterparts.”46  This insight is a useful caution to the general prefer-
ence expressed by many policy analysts for incentive-based instru-
ments.  Cass Sunstein, for example, would have the government adopt
a “presumption” in favor of “flexible, market-based incentives.”47
The relative desirability of market incentive instruments, however, is
an empirical question, because, as Professor Richards recognizes, the
“optimal choice of policy instrument to implement a particular pollu-
tion abatement goal depends upon the nature of the pollutant, the
kind of harm the pollutant causes, the available control technologies,
the number and type of polluting entities, and the type of market fail-
ure.”48  Sunstein and other supporters of market-incentive approaches
apparently assume that these conditions will favor market-based in-
struments more times than not, but we do not know of any empirical
evidence that would support such a general assumption.
Despite Professor Richards’ professed agnosticism, he slips on
occasion and exhibits a preference for market-incentive instruments
that is unsupported by his analysis.  More importantly, the entire ap-
proach that Professor Richards uses—choosing an instrument based
on the concept of cost-minimization—is itself an unwarranted prefer-
ence in favor of market-based incentives because it fails to account
for other environmental policy objectives that should be considered
along with cost in choosing an environmental instrument.
A.  Unsupported Preferences
Although Professor Richards’ cost-minimization approach does
not designate any instrument as preferred, he does observe, “[t]he
fact that taxes and marketable allowances tend to minimize both PC
and TX would seem to make them the instruments of choice for envi-
ronmental protection.”49  This statement is consistent with Sunstein’s
recommendation that there be a “presumption” in favor of such in-
struments.  Richards goes on to observe, “[h]owever, these advan-
tages might be overridden in some cases where the implementation
46. Id. at 226.
47. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 354 (1997).
48. Richards, supra note 2, at 226.
49. Id. at 279.  Richards also observes, “[g]enerally command-and-control regulation
should be preferred to the enterprise mode instruments on the basis of public finance considera-
tions.”  Id. at 281.  We are uncertain how to reconcile this statement with the one in the text
above.
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costs associated with incentive-based instruments are sufficiently high
due to information requirements, specialized assets, and uncertainty.
Thus, no instrument dominates the others in all cases.”50  We have the
same problem with this statement as we do with Sunstein’s assump-
tion.  Neither Richards (as far as we can tell from his article) nor we
know in how many cases the implementation costs associated with in-
centive-based instruments are sufficiently high that a non-incentive
approach is optimal.
If analysts are to engage in assumptions about the outcome of the
cost-minimization formula, we might engage in the opposite assump-
tion—that implementation costs generally weigh in favor of avoiding
market-based instruments because they are more difficult to imple-
ment.  Consider the following difficulties with implementing a pollu-
tion tax, which one of the authors identifies in an earlier article:
[The proponents of pollution taxes] assume[ ] that risks from toxic
substances could easily be reduced by simply assessing high taxes
on, for examples, toxic waste disposal and automobile emissions.
These optimistic assessments may underestimate the difficulties in-
herent in estimating risks and benefits.  In addition, the incentive-
based approach adds new uncertainties to the prediction of the
number of permits and level of taxes necessary to achieve a given
level of risk reduction, on top of the already existing uncertainties
about how various levels of exposure to toxic substances affect hu-
mans and the environment.  Unless agencies are prepared to toler-
ate potentially high exposures and/or devastating short-term eco-
nomic consequences during the time it takes for the system to reach
“steady state,” proceedings examining the level of tax or the issu-
able number of permits are likely to be highly contentious.  Moreo-
ver, because industry will likely resist any change to the status quo,
especially if it requires immediate outlays, implementation of any
market-based program is likely to be slow.51
Moreover, although Richards is quick to discuss the possibility of
opportunistic behavior on the part of the government, he does not
give equal time, or actually any time, to the possibility of opportunis-
tic behavior on the part of regulated entities.  Consider his discussion
of the pitfalls of opportunistic behavior, where he indicates that fear
of opportunistic behavior by the government may impede allowance
trading.52  But there may be other reasons why trading does not work
well, including opportunistic behavior by regulated entities, such as
50. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
51. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for
Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729, 745.
52. See Richards, supra note 2, at 262-63.
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overestimating compliance costs before the regulatory scheme goes
into effect.53  In essence, there are two competing explanations for
why a trading program may fail, in the sense that few, if any, trades
take place.  One explanation, offered by Professor Richards, is that
regulated entities are reluctant to trade because of their concern that
trades would reveal new cost information to the government and
would therefore cause the government to engage in stricter regula-
tion.54  Another explanation, not considered by Professor Richards, is
that few trades occur because most regulated entities can meet pollu-
tion limits without engaging in high cost abatement.  According to
this explanation, regulated entities lobby the government to adopt a
less stringent pollution limit because they argue that stricter emission
limitations would cost too much.  After the government accedes to
this argument, the entities are then able to meet the weaker pollution
goals at costs that are less (and sometimes much less) than the esti-
mates that they gave to the government.  The lower cost of the pollu-
tion abatement reduces the number of trades because there are few
firms with high abatement costs that wish to make trades with firms
that have lower abatement costs.
We do not know which of these stories is correct, although there
is some empirical support for the second theory that trades do not oc-
cur because abatement costs are low.55  Our point is simply that op-
portunistic behavior exists on both sides—regulators and regulated
entities—and further study is needed concerning why certain instru-
ments do or do not work.
53. See, e.g., Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Justice:
Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 251-
68 (1999) (providing a host of reasons why pollution trading may fail, including opportunistic
behavior by firms in overestimating both compliance costs and pollution reductions).
54. See Richards, supra note 2, at 262-63.
55. See Adam M. Finkel, A Return to Alchemy,  ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 15, 18
(finding that costs of installing emission control equipment on stationary sources of nitrogen
oxides to reduce acid deposition turned out to be between 20 and 50 percent of the amounts ini-
tially predicted).  Cf. Margaret Kriz, Heavy Breathing, NAT’L J., Jan. 4, 1997, at 8, 11 (discover-
ing that although electrical utility officials predicted during congressional debate on the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments that curbing sulfur dioxide emissions would cost $10,000 per ton,
reductions were subsequently made for as little as $100 per ton); Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift,
A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, 26
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,411, 10,423 (1996) (finding that aggregate annual compliance costs with acid
rain control provisions were $1.2-2.5 billion, not the $4 billion predicted); Curtis Moore, The
Impracticality and Immorality of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Setting Health-Related Standards, 11
TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 187, 199 n.55 (1998) (noting that  projections by utilities of rate increases that
would result from the adoption of proposed 1982 sulfur dioxide emissions requirements were far
too high).
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Still, we do not mean to dismiss Professor Richards’ useful in-
sight that “credible commitments” by the government against oppor-
tunistic behavior may be necessary to make trading work, and that
these commitments can be costly and infeasible.56  Indeed, the difficul-
ties encountered by the Interior Department in implementing its “no
surprises” policy under the Endangered Species Act seem to support
this warning.  Under this policy, the Fish and Wildlife Service prom-
ised that landowners who agreed to abide by habitat conservation
plans to protect listed species would not be subject to additional land
use restrictions or monetary sanctions, even if unforeseen circum-
stances made the plan agreed upon earlier ineffective.57  The “no sur-
prises” policy was obviously meant to “provide economic incentives
for businesses and landowners to participate in proactive species con-
servation and thereby help avoid the larger economic dislocation as-
sociated with species listings.”58  But the policy generated stiff political
opposition, particularly from environmental public interest groups,
who complained that it affords unwarranted benefits to regulated en-
tities.59  More specifically, critics have charged that the policy
“trade[s] species protection for landowner certainty,” conflicts with
congressional intent by placing the risks of scientific uncertainty on
the government and the public, undermines the utility of the statute’s
prohibition on the taking of species, and ignores agency statutory du-
ties to use all available means to conserve listed species.60
B.  Inherent Preference
Our more fundamental objection to Professor Richards’ cost-
minimization approach is that it ignores important aspects of choosing
an environmental instrument and that it may therefore bias the analy-
sis in favor of market-incentive instruments.  This defect is illustrated
by comparing Richards’ approach with one set of factors identified in
the 1995 OTA Report mentioned above.  The OTA study proposed
56. See Richards, supra note 2, at 264.
57. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8,859
(1998); ANDERSON ET AL. supra note 29, at 187; Robert L. Glicksman, Wildlife Habitat and
Protection, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW § 24.06[3]
(1998).
58. J.B. Ruhl, While the Cat’s Asleep: The Making of the “New” ESA, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T, Winter 1998, 187, 225.
59. See id.
60. Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heels of the
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 279, 283-84 (1998).  See also John H. Cushman,
Jr., The Endangered Species Act Gets A Makeover, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1998, at D2.
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that instruments be evaluated according to “environmental results,”
which includes evaluating the “assurance” that an instrument will
meet environmental goals, and that environmental equity and justice
will be attained in those results.61
The idea of “assurance” recognizes that instruments vary in
terms of how well stakeholders will be assured that environmental
goals will be met.  OTA justifies “assurance” as a criterion for evalua-
tion because it is a “bottom line criteria for many stakeholders, espe-
cially when [an] environmental problem poses serious risks to human
health.”62  When OTA compares instruments, it finds that what Ri-
chards describes as “command-and-control” instruments are “the
most effective at assuring stakeholders that environmental goals will
be met.”63  By comparison, OTA rated tradable emissions as less reli-
able according to this criterion because of the “potential difficulty
with monitoring.”64  Similarly, “pollution charges . . . have the poten-
tial to move things in the right direction,” but the “action-forcing
component is weakened since sources are given an option to pay
rather than to reduce their discharges.”65  OTA admitted, however,
that “more experience in the future with instruments such as trade-
able emissions . . . and pollution charges may increase the confidence
that stakeholders have that they can ensure results.”66  Richards, by
comparison, compares the relative costs of each instrument subject to
a “pollution abatement requirement.”67  Thus, he apparently assumes
that each instrument will meet the abatement requirement and that
he can therefore merely compare the instruments on the basis of cost.
The OTA Report also considers how instruments may differ in
terms of the “equality of environmental outcomes, full participation
by affected communities in decision-making, and freedom from bias
in policy implementation.”68  Consider, for example, environmental
justice, which recognizes that “environmental policies have discrimi-
nated against racial minorities and low-income communities in both
direct and indirect ways.”69  OTA warns that market-based incentives,
particularly tradable emissions and pollution charges, “may create se-
61. See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 144-45.
62. Id. at 146.
63. Id. at 147.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 147-48.
67. See Richards, supra note 2, at 228.
68. OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 145.
69. Id. at 160 (citation omitted).
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rious problems if equity is a major concern.”70  Tradable emissions, for
example, may be a problem because firms or industries have a
“choice which facilities will make improvements in performance and
in which order improvements will be made.”71  As a result, “individu-
als in one area or region could be comparatively worse off even
though others are much better off” and “even though the overall en-
vironmental performance for the industries or firms involved is im-
proved.”72  Pollution charges can cause the same problem because
firms in an area or region may decide to pay the charges rather than
reduce pollution, while firms in another area or region may reduce
pollution.73
The failure to consider factors such as effectiveness and equity
may bias the Richards framework in favor of market-based incen-
tives.  According to the OTA analysis, market-based incentives may
be less attractive in terms of their effectiveness and equity considera-
tions, yet neither consideration apparently is taken into account by
Richards.  To be fair, Richards may not intend that his analysis be the
end point in terms of the choice of instruments.  He may simply offer
his framework to identify the least cost instrument, and policy-makers
then can take into account other factors, such as effectiveness and en-
vironmental equity.  If so, it would be helpful for Professor Richards
to acknowledge the limitations of the analysis.
V.  THE ROLE OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Professor Richards states that his cost-minimization formula for
the selection of environmental policy instruments is “subject to” three
sets of potentially limiting factors, including legal and political con-
straints.74  Richards states that most previous studies of these instru-
ments have ignored the effect that legal constraints may have in nar-
rowing the range of available instruments.75  Rather than analyze the
70. Id. For more on the environmental justice implications of emissions trading, see Drury
et al., supra note 53.
71. OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 162.  On some of the choices made by firms in Los An-
geles under the RECLAIM program, see Drury et al., supra note 53, at 260.
72. OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 147.  One possible means of mitigating the resultant
undesirable concentrations of pollution, often referred to as "hot spots," would be to weight
tradable emissions such that the selling entity receives more credit for selling excess emissions to
a nearby source than it would by selling to a source located further away.
73. See id. at 164.
74. See Richards, supra note 2, at 228.  The third constraining factor identified by Richards
is “pollution abatement requirements.”  See discussion supra Part IV.
75. See Richards, supra note 2, at 224.
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role of legal constraints exhaustively, Richards highlights the poten-
tial for legal constraints to limit the government’s access to potentially
efficient instruments “as an important consideration in instrument
choice analysis.”76  Richards does not devote a separate section of his
article to the role of political constraints.  We agree that both legal
and political factors may limit the range of available environmental
policy instruments.  We would add that government policy-makers
are likely to devote more attention, in most situations, to the political
constraints than to some of the legal constraints raised by Richards as
potential limiting factors, such as the constitutional limitations ema-
nating from the takings clause.
A. Legal Constraints
Richards posits that constraints imposed by the takings clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may preclude the government
from employing the regulatory option as opposed to the government
production option when it seeks to retain control over production de-
cisions.77  As he points out, the Supreme Court has been more willing
in recent years than in past decades to find that the application of
regulatory schemes to property owners amounts to a compensable
taking.78  Among other things, the Court has cast doubt on the status
of the “harm-benefit” test,79 which, according to Richards, provided a
rule of thumb for resolving takings disputes for the better part of a
century.80  The uncertainty created by the Court’s shift in approach
and the sense that a more encompassing model of regulatory takings
has become entrenched among the courts may indeed have induced
government policy-makers in certain instances to resort to the gov-
ernment production instrument instead of the hierarchical regulatory
76. Id. at 273.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 273-75; see, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987).  See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987) (recognizing the availability of an inverse condemnation damage remedy for temporary
takings).  The courts may have begun to limit, if not roll back, the reach of these expansive tak-
ings precedents, however.  See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702
(1999) (holding that the Dolan rough proportionality test does not apply to denial of permission
to develop property); Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 94 N.Y.2d 96, 721
N.E.2d 971, 699 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1999) (holding that the Nollan essential nexus test does not apply
outside the exactions context).
79. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023-28.
80. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Making A Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 149 (October 2000).
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model.81  Still, takings considerations are likely to play a relatively mi-
nor role in environmental policy instrument selection except in cases
in which the regulatory scheme involves direct regulation of land use.
Because land use regulation remains primarily the province of state
and local regulation, as Professor Richards points out, takings con-
cerns will probably surface more frequently at those levels than in the
formulation of environmental policy by federal agencies.
The recent expansion of the protection afforded by the takings
clause to private property has not infringed significantly, if at all, on
the application of traditional command-and-control regulation by
agencies such as EPA.  It has long been clear that a regulation does
not amount to a taking just because it precludes a business from op-
erating as profitably as is would have in the absence of regulation.82
As Justice Scalia, of all people, recently confirmed, “business in the
sense of the activity of doing business, or the activity of making a
profit is not property in the ordinary sense.”83  Accordingly, “[a]s
heavy as the economic effects of [the federal pollution control] re-
quirements have been, they have not resulted in a wave of successful
takings claims for compensation.”84
The takings challenges that have raised the most serious ques-
tions have been those directed at regulatory schemes that directly re-
strict the use of land by barring or severely restricting development.
Thus, claims that the application of the CWA’s technology-based ef-
fluent limitations, as implemented through the National Pollutant
81. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting “the unprecedented chilling
effect” that the majority’s conclusion that land use regulation worked a taking “will obviously
have on public officials charged with the responsibility for drafting and implementing regula-
tions designed to protect the environment and the public welfare”).
82. See Concrete Pipe and Prod. of Calif., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (“mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient
to demonstrate a taking”); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(although the economic impact of regulation is a relevant consideration, mere diminution in
value of regulated property is not enough to work a taking).
83. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2225 (1999).
84. Oliver Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does that Say about
Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute Takings?, 80 IOWA L. REV.
297, 326 (1995).  Houck’s research “disclosed no cases in which pollution control requirements
were found to constitute a ‘taking’ for which just compensation was required and few cases that
even raised the issue.”  Id. at 326 n.164 (emphasis added).  He cites illustrative cases rejecting
takings claims.  By contrast, a state Supreme Court recently held that an effort to immunize by
statute certain agricultural activities from liability for externality-generating activities amounted
to a taking of neighboring property owners’ land.  See Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584
N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
SHAPIRO_FINAL-POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  11:05 AM
Spring 2000] GOALS, INSTRUMENTS, & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CHOICE 317
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program, to point
sources of pollution has worked a taking have not proliferated.  Yet,
cases alleging that the denial of permits under the same statute’s
dredge and fill permit program85 has resulted in a taking are myriad.
In some cases, the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit have found that the property of unsuccessful
permit applicants denied permission to develop in protected wetlands
has been taken.86
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is another statute that
promises to generate a series of Fifth Amendment takings claims by
property owners precluded from developing or otherwise using their
land by the statute’s prohibition on the taking (which includes habitat
modification) of protected species.87  In a recent decision, however,
the Federal Circuit rejected the assertion that the Act effected a tak-
ing despite depriving the owner of all economic value by requiring
that his property be maintained in its natural state and by specifying
onerous alternative development options that would avoid jeopard-
izing listed species found on the land.88  The property owner was un-
able to demonstrate reasonable, investment-backed expectations of
development, even though he bought the property before enactment
of the ESA.  The “regulatory climate” that existed at the time of pur-
chase, including the existence of the CWA’s dredge and fill permit
program, deprived the owner of any reasonable expectation of being
able to develop.89
85. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
86. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).  Takings challenges to dredge and fill permit denials
do not always succeed.  See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. de-
nied, 120 S. Ct. 1554 (2000); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
87. See Endangered Species Act (ESA) §§ 2-18, 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1537-1544,
1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).  But cf. Blaine I. Green, The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amend-
ment Takings: Constitutional Limits of Species Protection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 329 (1998) (as-
serting that the Fish and Wildlife Service has become “increasingly constrained” in its applica-
tion of the Endangered Species Act to avoid raising takings questions).  Professor Houck has
predicted that constitutional takings claims will arise under the Endangered Species Act.  But he
has argued that they should not succeed.  According to Houck, restrictions on development to
protect endangered species are analogous to pollution controls, which have generally not been
vulnerable to takings challenges because they replicate limitations on the use of private property
that inhere in common law private nuisance doctrine.  See Houck, supra note 84, at 321-31.
88. See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1554
(2000).
89. See id. at 1362-63.
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State and local regulators, of course, frequently engage in direct
land use regulation as a means of protecting the environment.  When
they do so, they risk running afoul of the takings clause, although they
may be protected to the extent that regulatory restrictions restate
limitations that inhere in the title of regulated property owners under
state property law doctrines such as nuisance law.90  If the takings
clause is going to have a meaningful constraining effect on environ-
mental policy instrument selection, therefore, it is most likely to be in
the context of state and local land use regulation.
Although Professor Richards does not explore them, the group
of federalism doctrines that the Supreme Court has recently invoked
to strike down a series of federal statutes (some with direct environ-
mental applications) may have a more significant impact on instru-
ment selection than the takings clause.  The Supreme Court has in the
last few years relied on the commerce clause,91 the Tenth Amend-
ment,92 and the Eleventh Amendment93 to invalidate statutes as be-
yond the scope of federal legislative power.94  To date, these decisions
have not resulted in a radical restructuring in the scope of the power
of federal environmental agencies.95
Regulated entities have relied on the Court’s 1995 decision in
Lopez to attack a variety of federal regulatory programs as beyond
the scope of the commerce power.  For the most part, these attacks
have failed.  One appellate court, for example, held that the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) is a legitimate exercise of the commerce power, even as
the statute applies to hazardous waste contamination located entirely
in one state.96  Sometimes, however, the question has been close.  The
90. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
91. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
92. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
93. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  See generally Stephen R. McAllister &
Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Environmental Law in the “New” Federalism Era, 30 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11122 (2000); Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, State Liability for Environ-
mental Violations: The U.S. Supreme Court’s “New” Federalism, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10665
(1999) [hereinafter McAllister & Glicksman, State Liability].
94. The Lopez case represented the first time the Court struck down a statute as beyond
the scope of the commerce power since the New Deal.
95. However, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court did bar the fed-
eral government from forcing the states to take title to low-level radioactive waste not properly
disposed of within the time periods specified by statute.
96. See United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in a split
decision, and with a notable lack of consensus as to rationale, that the
ESA is supported by the commerce power, even as it applies to ef-
forts to protect a species located entirely in one state.97  The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did overturn a felony conviction under
a provision of the CWA’s dredge and fill permit program regulations
applicable to intrastate, isolated wetlands.98  The holding did not rest
directly on constitutional grounds, however.  Rather, the court held
that the regulation was beyond the agency’s statutory authority as a
means of avoiding the constitutional question that would have arisen
had the regulation been authorized by statute.  Furthermore, the Sev-
enth Circuit subsequently upheld the constitutionality of the applica-
tion of the dredge and fill permit program to isolated wetlands that
actually provide habitat to migratory birds based on the substantial
effects on interstate commerce that would result from the class of ac-
tivities involving the destruction of migratory bird habitat.99  The
court deferred to EPA’s position that Congress intended to regulate
those wetlands and distinguished the Fourth Circuit’s decision as a
case involving potential as opposed to actual use of wetlands by mi-
gratory birds.100
The Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence will bar suits by
private entities against states for alleged violations of the federal en-
vironmental statutes, but the authority of the United States to pursue
such violations has not been affected, and a plethora of other avenues
of forcing states to comply with federal regulatory obligations re-
mains.101  The Eleventh Amendment cases, of course, will have no
97. See National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 936 (1998).  See also Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding, in
another split decision, that regulatory restrictions on the taking of red wolves on private land
did not violate the Commerce Clause).  See generally John C. Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998).  Post-Lopez commerce
clause attacks on other federal species protection legislation have all come to naught.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (challenging the Eagle Protection Act);
United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1244-45 (D. Or. 1996) (challenging the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996)
(challenging the Lacey Act).
98. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
99. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 191 F.3d
845, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 2001 WL 15333 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2001).
100. See id. at 851-52.  See also United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 14 F.Supp.2d 1069,
1074-75 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (upholding the same congressional objective of preventing actual wet-
land habitat destruction).
101. See generally McAllister & Glicksman, State Liability, supra note 93.
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effect on the selection of instruments to ensure compliance with envi-
ronmental laws by private parties.
It may be that the Supreme Court’s efforts to erect barriers to
the exercise of federal legislative power have not yet reached fruition
and that future developments will strike further at the core of federal
authority to regulate activities with potential adverse environmental
impacts.  As things now stand, though, the federalism limitations
stemming from the recent commerce clause, Tenth Amendment, and
Eleventh Amendment cases should constrain environmental policy
instrument selection by federal agencies only at the margins.
B. Political Constraints
The political constraints mentioned by Professor Richards are
likely to play a more vital role than the legal constraints in eliminating
some policy instruments from serious consideration and relegating
agencies to the selection of others.  Recognizing that political consid-
erations historically have continued to play a major role in every as-
pect of the formulation and implementation of environmental policy
and that they will undoubtedly continue to do so is to state the obvi-
ous.  Political factors have shaped the scope of federal regulatory
programs.  The CWA’s failure to regulate nonpoint sources of surface
water pollution has nothing to do with either science or economics
and everything to do with politics.102  The impact of a certain amount
of water pollution on a given receiving body of water is the same re-
gardless of its source.  The identity of the origin of the pollution
therefore provides no basis for deciding to regulate point sources to
the hilt but to ignore nonpoint source pollution.  As EPA has pro-
ceeded to implement the various iterations of the CWA’s technology-
based effluent limitations for point sources, the marginal costs of con-
trolling those sources have increased.  In many cases, therefore, it
would likely be more efficient to generate further effluent reductions
from nonpoint sources than to slap yet another level of more stringent
controls on point sources.  The reason Congress has not authorized
EPA to do so is largely political—regulation of nonpoint sources
tends to look like land use control, and land use control traditionally
102. This probably overstates the point.  The government’s oversight costs may be higher
under a system of nonpoint source control than under a system of point source control due to
the large number of nonpoint sources, their dispersed nature, and the general unavailability of
best available technology-based mechanisms for controlling runoff from activities like agricul-
ture, silviculture, and construction.  Thus, even if production costs of nonpoint source controls
may be no higher (and, as indicated below, may well be lower) than for point source controls,
implementation costs may be higher.
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has been the jealously guarded prerogative of state and local govern-
ments.103  Any effort by Congress or EPA to regulate nonpoint
sources would appear to some to represent a dangerous intrusion into
local matters and would provoke a hue and cry that might redound to
the detriment of the entire regulatory program by casting aspersions
on the validity of federal regulation writ large.  In similar fashion, po-
litical considerations were largely responsible for Congress’ decision
to allocate authority under the CWA to establish and implement am-
bient water quality standards to the states rather than to EPA.104
Political factors also may dictate instrument selection, regardless
of the economic efficiency of the resulting choices.  It may have made
more sense from an economic perspective to allow new coal-burning
stationary sources of air pollution to meet national standards of per-
formance under the CAA by choosing the least-cost compliance
methodology, whether that turned out to be fuel-switching or scrub-
ber installation.  Allowing regulated entities that degree of discretion,
however, was likely to lead to an increase in the use of low-sulfur coal
located in western states and a decrease in the use of high-sulfur coal
found in Appalachia and the Mid-west.  That result was unacceptable
to politicians from high-sulfur coal-bearing states.  The upshot, until it
was eliminated in 1990,105 was a provision requiring fossil fuel-fired
stationary sources subject to new source standards of performance to
achieve a percentage reduction in the emissions that would result
from burning untreated coal, regardless of its sulfur content.106
Political factors may also provide a partial explanation for the
paucity of emissions fees and taxes in federal pollution control pro-
grams, despite their theoretical superiority to command-and-control
regulation on efficiency grounds.  Emission taxes might be set by
comparing the value of differences in the marginal cost of increasing
and decreasing pollution with the marginal benefits in resource pro-
tection resulting from such changes in pollution levels.107  There is no
guarantee that polluters would respond to the tax to a degree that
produces the desired level of environmental quality.  If the tax gener-
103. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 613-14.
104. See Mississippi Comm’n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir.
1980) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 89-215, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3313, 3320-23).
105. See supra note 37 & accompanying text.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1988).  For an explanation of the political backdrop as well as
criticism of the percentage reduction requirement, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T.
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).  For a defense of the requirement, see Eugene M.
Trisko, Universal Scrubbing: Cleaning the Air, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 983 (1982).
107. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 495.
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ates less than the amount of pollution reduction necessary to reach
the environmental quality protection goal, it will be necessary to ei-
ther modify the goal or increase the amount of the tax.  Policy-makers
intent on reaching a predetermined level of environmental quality
may fear that hiking up a pollution tax once it is set will be politically
impossible.108  They may therefore opt for a “hierarchical” instead of
an incentive-based approach due to a conviction that adjustments to a
regulatory scheme may be more politically palatable than tax in-
creases if initial predictions of the pollution reductions to be gener-
ated by each turn out to be too optimistic.
Environmental policy, then, is churned out in a highly political
arena.  Policy-makers take these factors into account in opting for one
goal rather than another and in selecting one instrument for achieving
the selected goal in lieu of available alternatives.  Indeed, those af-
fected by environmental policy may decide to trade off goals for poli-
cies or vice versa to minimize the impacts of these political con-
straints.  Some environmental public interest groups, for example,
may be willing to accept a program that authorizes effluent trading
between point and nonpoint sources, despite skepticism over the de-
gree to which regulators can police such trades, because they perceive
it as a way to pull nonpoint sources into the CWA regulatory net in a
way that otherwise would be politically impossible.
VI.  COST-MINIMIZATION IN A WORLD OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY
In Part II, we objected to the idea that cost-minimization is the
only criterion that should guide the choice of environmental policy in-
struments.  We recognize, however, the importance of taking costs
into account in this choice, and we find Professor Richards’ cost-
minimization framework to be an important and useful recommenda-
tion concerning how to account for costs.  The actual benefit of the
framework, however, is a function of how readily decision-makers are
able to compile the relative cost information that the framework re-
quires.  If the framework is to become a useful decision-making tool,
Professor Richards will need to consider how easily it can be adopted
in a world where decision-makers lack complete information at the
time they are required to act.
Professor Richards underpins his analysis of implementation
costs with “lessons” from the New Institutional Economics.109  This
108. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 51, at 748.
109. See Richards, supra note 2, at 256.
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literature recognizes that economic actors will choose the business ar-
rangement that yields for them the greatest economic benefit at the
lowest cost.  The choice of such arrangements, however, is subject to
collective action problems, including “bounded rationality,” or limits
concerning the actors’ knowledge and understanding.  Thus, one of
the challenges to choosing the “best” business arrangement is that
structural choices must be made under conditions of uncertainty.110
The idea of “bounded rationality” was originated by Herbert Simon
and James March, who posited that institutional decision-making is a
function of “bounded rationality” because of limitations concerning
knowledge and understanding.111  Simon’s essential insight was that
organizations were unable to choose the “optimal” solution to a
problem because of organizational time and cost constraints.112  The
impossibility of choosing the “optimal” solution forced organizations
to engage in “satisficing” or to find a “course of action that is satisfac-
tory or good enough.”113
Professor Richards’ framework would have us choose the “opti-
mal” instrument—the instrument that minimizes the costs that he
identifies.  But the New Institutional Economics, with its focus on fac-
tors like bounded rationality, reminds us that optimization is not al-
ways possible under real world conditions.  Based on realistic limita-
tions on time, information, and understanding, it will be difficult for
decision-makers to make accurate comparisons of the sum of (PC +
IC + TX) for implementation purposes.  Just as economic actors have
to adjust business arrangements in light of uncertainty, government
decision-makers have to make instrument choices in light of uncer-
tainty.  Having identified a framework for choosing the optimal solu-
tion, we hope that Professor Richards will suggest in future publica-
tions how his framework can be adapted to the real world conditions
in which decision-makers operate.
VII.  CONCLUSION
There has been an important debate in the environmental policy
literature over the choice of policy instruments.114  Professor Richards’
110. See id. at 261-62.
111. See generally JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958).
112. See generally HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PRACTICES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 65-68, 122, 174-75 (1st ed. 1948).
113. See id., 3rd ed. 1976, at xxiv.
114. For excellent recent articles, see Keohane et al., supra note 9; Daniel H. Cole & Peter
Z. Grossman, When Is Command and Control “Efficient”: Institutions, Technology, and the
SHAPIRO_FINAL-POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  11:05 AM
324 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:297
proposed framework adds considerable clarity and insight to these
deliberations.  We expect that others will find the framework as use-
ful as we did and that it will play a central role in the debate over
regulatory instruments in environmental policy.
In an effort to improve the usefulness of Professor Richards’ de-
cision-making framework, we have discussed four aspects of the
framework that we believe require clarification, qualification, or
elaboration.  None of our points disputes the importance of Richards’
contribution to the literature, although each suggests that additional
fine-tuning of the analysis may be necessary.
First, Richards does not clearly indicate that policy-makers can
pair non-utilitarian environmental goals with regulatory instruments
that rely on economic incentives to reduce risks to humans and the
environment.  Thus, choosing instruments that rely on market incen-
tives does not require Congress to change existing regulatory goals.
Second, Richards also fails to clearly explain that command-and-
control instruments vary in terms of the extent to which they give
governmental officials the power to specify the means by which
regulated entities must protect the public and the environment.
When Richards discusses command-and-control standards, he does
not clearly distinguish “design” and “performance” standards, which
are different in terms of the extent to which they permit regulated en-
tities to choose the method of compliance.  Failure to draw that dis-
tinction may lead environmental policy-makers to ignore perform-
ance standards even in situations in which they represent the least
cost instrument, as measured by Richards’ formula, available for
achieving a particular policy goal.
Third, Richards’ framework may contain a hidden presumption
in favor of incentive-based instruments.  Richards does not acknowl-
edge that policy instruments differ in terms of their capacity to reduce
pollution or address other environmental problems.  Likewise, in-
struments may have different impacts in terms of environmental jus-
tice.  Richards may not intend to preclude these considerations, but
he should clarify how they would interact with his cost-minimization
formula.
Finally, Richards may understate some of the difficulties in
adopting his framework for actual environmental decision-making.
He notes there are legal and political limitations, but his analysis ap-
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999).
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pears to underestimate how politics skews instrument choice.  He also
does not discuss the impact of bounded rationality on the use of his
own framework.  Agencies cannot easily obtain the information nec-
essary to determine which instrument minimizes implementation
costs.  These objections do not detract from the fundamental value of
Richards’ framework, but they do suggest that it will not necessarily
be easy to adopt it.
